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Associations and Forums:
Situating CLS v. Martinez
by ASHUTOSH BHAGWAT*
Introduction
In Christian Legal Society v. Martinez,' the Supreme Court held
that the University of California, Hastings College of the Law
("Hastings"), a public law school, could deny registration as an
officially recognized student group to a group of law school students
called the Christian Legal Society ("CLS"). CLS refused, for
religious reasons, to permit either homosexual students or students
who did not share their religious beliefs to join their club. The
decision generated a passionate dissent joined by four Justices,2
culminating with the fulmination that the Martinez "decision is a
serious setback for freedom of expression in this country."3  What
exactly was at stake in the Martinez decision, as a factual matter and
as a matter of legal principle? And did the decision represent an
unwarranted weakening of "freedom of expression?" This article will
argue that, in fact, the answers to those questions are far more
complex than either the majority or dissenting Justices in Martinez
acknowledged. Indeed, this article will argue that the Martinez Court
focused on the wrong facts and the wrong law, asked the wrong
questions, and so unsurprisingly provided answers which had little to
do with what was actually at stake in the case.
For the Court, Martinez was a case about free speech and
funding. Both the majority and the dissent referred primarily to the
* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law
(bhagwata@uchastings.edu). Thanks to the staff of the Hastings Constitutional Law
Quarterly for organizing this symposium, and to fellow speakers for an extremely valuable
and insightful conversation about the issues raised by the Martinez case. Thanks also to
John Inazu for very helpful comments on a previous draft.
1. Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010).
2. Id. at 3000 (Alito, J., dissenting).
3. Id. at 3020.
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Court's free speech jurisprudence, and analyzed the Martinez case by
reference to previous decisions regarding the restrictions that the
government may impose when funding speech.' However, Martinez is
not truly a case about speech at all. Building on other work,' I argue
in this article that Martinez is a case centrally about the right to
freedom of association. In particular, it is a case that critically turns
on the relationship between associations of citizens and the state, and
the ways in which the Constitution constrains those relationships.
Martinez implicates two different kinds of questions about the
relationship between associations and the state: first, regarding
government sponsorship and funding of associations; and second, the
exclusion of private associations from government physical property.
Part I briefly summarizes the Martinez decision, focusing in
particular on certain facts and certain aspects of the opinions in the
Supreme Court that have otherwise been underemphasized. Part II
discusses the First Amendment right of association, its role in
Martinez, and its general place in the Court's First Amendment
jurisprudence. Part III analyzes the problem of association and state
sponsorship, a question raised to the fore by the efforts of the
Christian Legal Society to register as an official student organization
at Hastings. Finally, Part IV considers the practical impact on CLS of
Hastings's denial to them of official status, and considers whether
CLS might have been able to make alternative arguments regarding
the associational rights of even unofficial student groups which might
have ameliorated that impact.
I. The CLS v. Martinez Decision
A. The Facts
Hastings administers a "Registered Student Organization"
("RSO") program which permits student groups-made up
exclusively of Hastings students-to be recognized as official student
organizations. RSOs receive certain benefits from Hastings, including
the right to use the Hastings name and logo, very limited funding
derived from a mandatory student activity fee, access to certain
communications channels including a weekly newsletter and the
campus-wide email system, and (crucially) free, preferred access to
4. The primary decision, discussed extensively by both the majority and dissent, is
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
5. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Associational Speech, 120 YALE L.J. 978 (2011).
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physical spaces on campus including classrooms and other meeting
spaces.' As conditions for RSO status, Hastings insists that RSOs be
noncommercial and limited to students, and that RSOs agree to abide
by Hastings's Nondiscrimination Policy, which forbids discrimination
on a number of grounds, including religion and sexual orientation.
Pursuant to a stipulation between the parties, the Supreme Court
majority understood this policy, as applied by Hastings to RSOs, to
require RSOs to accept all students as members, regardless of their
status or beliefs-what the parties and the Court called the "all-
comers" policy.! In the Supreme Court, CLS disputed this
understanding of the policy. Similarly, the dissent raised doubts
about whether the all-comers policy was in fact Hastings's official
policy, and whether it was evenhandedly enforced.' For the purposes
of this paper, I will assume the facts as stipulated by the parties and
understood by the majority, though (as I discuss later) it makes little
difference, given my analysis, whether the actual Hastings policy was
the all-comers policy or the written Nondiscrimination Policy.
This litigation arose when, in September of 2004, CLS submitted
an application to Hastings for RSO status, accompanied (as required)
with a copy of the CLS bylaws. Those bylaws required members and
officers of CLS to sign a "Statement of Faith" setting forth certain
tenets of Christian faith, and was interpreted by CLS to require the
exclusion of anyone who engages in "unrepentant homosexual
conduct."' Hastings rejected the CLS application on the grounds that
its bylaws were inconsistent with the Hastings Nondiscrimination
Policy, and refused CLS an exemption from that policy when it was
requested (CLS in turn refused to amend its bylaws). Litigation then
commenced. After discovery and the entry of a joint stipulation of
facts, the District Court upheld Hastings's policy as a reasonable,
viewpoint-neutral restriction on free speech, and the Ninth Circuit
affirmed.o The Supreme Court then granted certiorari."
6. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2979.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 3003-06, 3016-19 (Alito, J., dissenting).
9. Id. at 2980 & n.3 (majority opinion).
10. Christian Legal Soc'y v. Kane, 319 Fed. Appx. 645 (9th Cir. 2009).
11. Martinez, 131 S. Ct. at 2982.
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B. Majority Opinion
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote an opinion for a five-Justice
majority, affirming the Ninth Circuit's decision. The majority
described the plaintiff's challenge to Hastings's RSO policy as
drawing upon two different strands of the Court's First Amendment
jurisprudence: A line of free speech cases setting forth the limits that
the government may impose on speech in government property
constituting "limited public forums," including funding programs; and
a line of cases analyzing whether associational freedom can be
constrained by antidiscrimination laws.12 The majority, however,
declined to analyze the claims separately, holding instead that CLS's
associational claim should be subsumed into its public forum/free
speech claim. The primary reason it gave for this decision was that
the two claims "merge" because "[w]ho speaks on [CLS's] behalf ...
colors what concept is conveyed." 3 In addition, the majority argued
that it would be "anomalous" for it to grant greater protection to the
associational than to the speech claim because the two claims were
"intertwined," and granting such protection would undermine the
government's presumed right to exclude selected speakers and groups
from a limited public forum, so long as it is on a viewpoint-neutral
basis." Finally, the majority concluded that the associational cases
were inapplicable, because they involved direct regulation and not the
withholding of benefits." As we will see, this decision by the Court to
merge the associational claim into a free speech claim was a critical
step-I will argue the critical misstep-in its analysis; but it
nonetheless went unremarked on by the dissent.
Having decided to analyze the case under its limited public
forum doctrine, the question posed to the Court was whether
Hastings's RSO rules were reasonable and viewpoint neutral. The
majority concluded easily that they were. Deferring somewhat to
Hastings on this point, the Court found the all-comers policy
reasonable because it ensured that all students may gain access to
programs funded by their fees, because it enabled Hastings to enforce
its policy more easily, and because it advanced the pedagogical goal
of bringing diverse students together." The majority also emphasized
12. Id. at 2984-85.
13. Id. at 2985.
14. Id. at 2975.
15. Id. at 2985-86.
16. Id. at 2988-90.
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that denial of RSO status to CLS left substantial other channels of
communications open to CLS, including use of chalkboards and some
bulletin boards to advertise events, and the use of off-campus
resources such as social networking sites to communicate within the
group." Finally, the majority found the policy viewpoint neutral
because it applied to all groups, and so by definition was not
discriminating based on viewpoint. Any differential impact that the
policy might have on religious groups such as CLS, the majority
concluded, was purely incidental." Because the all-comers policy
satisfied both prongs of the Court's limited public forum test, the
Court found that it did not violate the First Amendment.
C. Concurring Opinions
Two members of the majority, Justices John Paul Stevens and
Anthony Kennedy, also wrote concurring opinions. Justice Stevens's
concurrence addressed a question ignored by the majority but
highlighted by the dissent, which was whether application of
Hastings's written Discrimination Policy (as opposed to the all-comers
policy) to CLS would violate the First Amendment. Justice Stevens
argued that the Nondiscrimination Policy was a neutral regulation of
conduct, not a viewpoint-based regulation of speech, and that it
applied neutrally as well, prohibiting religious discrimination
regardless of the ideological motive for it. He also emphasized
differences between the campus context and other, traditional public
forums (what he calls "the public square"), concluding that those
differences justified greater limits on who may participate in forums
such as the RSO program. 9
Justice Kennedy also filed a concurring opinion. Responding to
the dissent's critique of the all-comers policy, Justice Kennedy
emphasized the pedagogical and other benefits of the policy. In
particular, Justice Kennedy emphasized that the policy was
formulated and enforced neutrally by Hastings, and that Hastings has
a legitimate interest in seeking to teach law students to interact with
students who do not share their beliefs and viewpoints. The all-
comers policy advances these interests, he argued, by ensuring that
RSOs do not become enclaves of like-minded thinkers.20
17. Id. at 2991.
18. Id. at 2993-94.
19. Id. at 2995-98 (Stevens, J., concurring).
20. Id. at 2998-3000 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Spring 2011] 547
D. Dissenting Opinion
Justice Samuel Alito, writing for four Justices, wrote a vehement
dissent. Much of the dissent is dedicated to challenging the majority's
reading of the record and the facts, arguing that the all-comers policy
is not (contrary to the parties' stipulation) the true policy enforced by
Hastings, and also arguing that Hastings had enforced its
nondiscrimination policies selectively against CLS. More to the
point, the dissent also disagreed with the majority about the impact
on CLS of being denied RSO status. Justice Alito read the record as
demonstrating that the loss of access to campus communications
devastated the organization, and that the loss of RSO status, in
practice, also deprived CLS of the access to Hastings's physical
spaces, including classrooms. Because, he said (quoting CLS), "[t]o
university students, the campus is their world," the practical impact of
this physical exclusion was to destroy CLS.21
Reaching the merits, the dissent largely accepted the majority's
doctrinal framework, including in particular the requirements of
reasonableness and viewpoint neutrality.' The dissent did seem to
emphasize CLS's associational rights more than the majority, but that
emphasis did not shift the dissent's doctrinal framework any, since the
dissent appeared to accept the limited public forum doctrine as the
appropriate law to apply to CLS's claim.23 The dissent's key legal
disagreement with the majority was on the question of viewpoint
neutrality. Justice Alito argued that as applied to religious groups,
but no one else, Hastings's written Nondiscrimination Policy was
viewpoint based because it precluded religious groups, but no others,
from excluding members based on their beliefs. This violated the
First Amendment, Justice Alito argued, because requiring CLS to
admit members who did not share its beliefs "interfere[d] with the
group's ability to convey its views." 24 The dissent thought that
nonreligious groups could be barred from religious discrimination,
because admitting members without regard to religion would not
interfere with their ability to express their views." For CLS, however,
the dissent argued that application of the written policy violated the
First Amendment.
21. Id. at 3007 (Alito, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 3009.
23. Id. at 3010-12.
24. Id. at 3011.
25. Id. at 3012.
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The dissent also thought that the all-comers policy could not be
applied to CLS. Most significantly, the dissent thought the policy
unreasonable because it homogenizes student groups and so
suppresses the sort of dialogue among diverse student groups that the
RSO policy was (according to the dissent) designed to foster. Finally,
the dissent thought that the all-comers policy as applied by Hastings
also was not viewpoint neutral, because it had not been applied
neutrally to RSOs other than CLS.
In short, despite the general agreement among the Justices
regarding the doctrinal framework to be applied in Martinez, the
Court split sharply on how those legal principles played out in the
case itself. Much of the disagreement centered on the factual
question of whether the all-comers policy was a genuine, neutrally
applied policy; but there were also legal disagreements among the
Justices regarding what viewpoint neutrality means in the context of
conduct regulations such as the Nondiscrimination and all-comers
policies. In the next part, I will argue that these disagreements are
rooted in a profound confusion, shared by all the Justices, about the
real legal interests at stake in cases like Martinez.
II. Martinez, Free Speech, and the Right of Association
To summarize the argument of this part briefly, the key error
made by all the Justices in Martinez was to treat the case as one
primarily about the right of free speech, rather than about freedom of
association. That error was profound, and it led the Court into a
frankly nonsensical analysis; but it was also unsurprising. The Court's
miscues in Martinez are rooted in half a century of jurisprudence in
which the Court has essentially eviscerated the First Amendment's
right of association. This part begins by discussing the Court's
historical treatment of the association right and its relationship to free
speech. It then discusses why Martinez is at its heart a case about
association, not speech, and how a nuanced understanding of the
association right clarifies the issues in Martinez.
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A. Free Speech and Association: A Misunderstood Relationship2
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution reads as
follows:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
d f 27redress of grievances.
Putting aside the first two clauses regarding freedom of religion,
the Amendment protects four distinct rights: freedom of speech,
freedom of the press, freedom to peaceably assemble, and freedom to
petition the government. The Court has also long held that the First
Amendment protects an implicit right to associate with fellow citizens
to pursue common political and social goals." Yet it is fair to say that
aside from the religion clauses, First Amendment case law and
scholarship overwhelmingly focuses on the free speech clause,
essentially ignoring the rest of the Amendment. This neglect of other
First Amendment protections, especially of association, has
substantially distorted the Court's First Amendment analysis. In
other work, I have described in detail how the Court's treatment of
the associational right became distorted over the past century, and
what a revived associational right might look like.29  I briefly
summarize my arguments here.
Like the free speech clause, sustained attention to the association
right in the Supreme Court began in the post-World War I era. In
particular, the first sustained attention to association by the Court
was in Whitney v. California in 1927,3 in which both the majority
opinion and Justice Louis Brandeis's famous concurring opinion
appeared to recognize at least a potential constitutional right on the
part of Anita Whitney to assemble with or associate with (the Court
appeared to consider the concepts interchangeable) the Communist
26. See Richard A. Posner, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION
(1992).
27. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2& See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000); NAACP v. Ala. ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
29. See Bhagwat, supra note 5, at 983-94. The discussion in this section draws heavily
upon this piece.
30. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
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Labor Party. Significantly, both the majority and Justice Brandeis
treated the right as a distinct right, separate from free speech, and
appeared to root that right in the Assembly Clause of the First
Amendment." In the three decades following Whitney, the Court
applied these assembly/association rights in a series of cases,32
consistently treating them as independent rights which are "cognate
to those of free speech and free press and ... equally fundamental." 3
During this period, then, the Court considered freedoms of
association and assembly to be interchangeable rights, it treated those
rights as co-equal and "cognate" to other First Amendment rights,
and it considered those rights to be firmly rooted in the text of the
First Amendment.
Then, a critical change occurred in the Court's treatment of
association. The key case was the Court's 1958 decision in NAACP v.
Alabama ex rel. Patterson.' While the NAACP Court upheld an
associational claim, it fundamentally changed its treatment of the
relevant right in two ways. First, the Court began to emphasize
"association" rather than "assembly" as the relevant right. Second,
the Court described association not as an independent right but as a
right derivative of free speech, the primary significance of which was
as a means to facilitate free speech. The freestanding, textually
rooted right of the early cases has been lost. Furthermore, since
NAACP the Court has adhered to its reinterpretation of the
association right. Most significantly, the Court's two most important
modern association cases, Roberts v. United States Jaycees6 and Boy
Scouts of America v. Dale," continued to describe the associational
right as one derivative of free speech and protected only to the extent
that it is necessary to permit free expression. In Roberts the Court
rejected the Jaycees' claim of an associational right to refuse to admit
women as members because it concluded that including women
would not interfere with the organization's ability to express its
views." And while in Dale the Court did recognize the Boy Scouts'
31. See id. at 371 (majority opinion); id. at 372 (Brandeis, J. concurring).
32. See DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516
(1945); and Am. Commc'ns Ass'n. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
33. DeJonge, 299 U.S. at 364.
34. NAACP v. Ala. ex rel Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
35. Id. at 461.
36. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
37. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
38. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 626-27.
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associational right to exclude a gay assistant scoutmaster, it was only
because of its conclusion that inclusion of Dale as a scoutmaster
interfered with the Scouts' ability to express a message of hostility to
homosexuality. 9 In short, since 1958 the Court has consistently
subsumed the association right into the free speech right, to the
detriment of associational freedoms. In this respect, the Martinez
Court's failure to give serious consideration to CLS's associational
claim is entirely consistent with recent practice.
The final piece of the puzzle is to understand that both historical
scholarship and First Amendment theory strongly support the view
that the Court's original treatment of association and assembly as
independent, important rights was more faithful to the text and
purposes of the First Amendment than its modern approach. A spate
of recent scholarship has clearly demonstrated the deep, historical
roots of the rights of assembly and association (as well as the related
right to petition the government) and their significance in pre-
Revolutionary England and in the early years of the American
Republic.' That scholarship also reveals that these rights, though
independent, were also closely interrelated and often exercised in
tandem.4 1
Moreover, neither the independent significance of the
assembly/association right nor the relationship between the various
rights protected by the First Amendment should be surprising when
viewed through a theoretical lens. I begin with the presumption that
the primary purpose of the First Amendment, perhaps other than the
Religion Clauses, is to protect and effectuate democratic self-
governance.42 Critically, however, it is not just free speech that
contributes to democracy. Assembly, association, and petitioning
also contribute directly and critically to self-rule, by permitting
citizens to organize themselves independently of the state, develop
their thoughts and values collectively, and communicate their views to
public officials. These activities are no less fundamental to self-
39. Dale, 530 U.S. at 650-51, 653.
40. See Tabatha Abu EI-Haj, The Neglected Right of Assembly, 56 UCLA L. REV. 543
(2009); John D. Inazu, The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly, 84 TUL. L. REV. 565 (2010)
[hereinafter Inazu, Forgotten Freedom]; John D. Inazu, The Strange Origins of the
Constitutional Right of Association, 77 TENN. L. REV. 485 (2010) [hereinafter, Inazu, Right
of Association]; Jason Mazzone, Freedom's Associations, 77 WASH. L. REV. 639 (2002).
41. See, e.g., Mazzone, 77 WASH. L. REV. at 722-23.
42. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 20 (1971); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM
OF FREE SPEECH 121-65 (1993).
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governance than speech and publication. Moreover, these rights
operate in tandem, each facilitating the exercise of other rights of self-
governance. This is what the Court's early description of the key
First Amendment political liberties as "cognate" means.43
B. Association in CLS v. Martinez
The above discussion helps to clarify the analytic failures that
underlay both the majority and dissenting opinions in CLS v.
Martinez. Following recent precedent, the Justices considered the
primary right at issue in Martinez to be free speech, treating
association as a minor and derivative right, relevant only insofar as
intrusions into CLS's associational autonomy interfered with the
organization's ability to express itself. This, however, is clearly
incorrect. The primary goals of CLS as an organization were not
communicative, they were to provide a forum in which similarly
thinking individuals could share and reaffirm their values and worship
together. Moreover, the primary burden imposed by Hastings was
not on CLS's ability to communicate; rather, it was on its ability to
select its members-in other words, on CLS members' choice to
associate with whomever they want. In this regard, the dissent's
arguments that CLS sought to express a viewpoint through its
membership requirements, and that imposing nondiscrimination
requirements interfered with its ability to express its opinions, are
deeply unconvincing (and have no factual basis in the record)."
Nothing in the all-comers policy stopped CLS from adhering to and
expressing its thoughts, insofar as it desired to do so.45 This was a case
about association.
Moreover, recasting CLS v. Martinez as an associational case
substantially strengthens CLS's constitutional claims. As a matter of
free speech doctrine, CLS's claims based on stipulated facts before
the Court were quite weak, for all of the reasons given by the
majority.46 The all-comers policy was obviously a neutral regulation
of conduct (absent proof of pretext), and any impact on CLS's ability
43. For a fuller discussion of these ideas, see Bhagwat, supra note 5, at 995-99.
44. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 3009 n.2, 3011 (Alito, J., dissenting).
45. One caveat is necessary here. If, in fact, the all-comers policy subjected CLS to a
"hostile takeover" by unfriendly students as posited by the dissent, id. at 3019 (Alito, J.,
dissenting), such interference might exist. Such a takeover seems extraordinarily unlikely
however, and there was no evidence in the record of such a takeover ever occurring at
Hastings. Id. at 2992 (majority opinion).
46. Id. at 2988-95.
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to speak was surely incidental.47 Analyzing CLS's argument through
the lens of association, however, complicates the analysis. This is
because Hastings's regulation of RSO membership, whether through
the all-comers policy or the written Nondiscrimination Policy, is a
direct intrusion on the freedom to choose with whom one wishes to
associate, which is surely at the heart of the associational right. The
impact of those rules on association is thus not incidental; it is direct,
raising core constitutional concerns. Moreover, with respect to the
written Nondiscrimination Policy, while application of that policy
might not discriminate on the basis of speech viewpoint, it does
represent a substantive, governmental preference limiting the
associational freedoms of citizens. Such restrictions are highly
problematic from the perspective of self-governance and must be
carefully scrutinized. Without the ability to select its own members,
associations of citizens cannot effectively formulate, identify, and
communicate their views on cultural and political questions or
otherwise provide a vehicle for citizens to exercise their sovereign
authority over the state. This is also why the Court's decision in Boy
Scouts of America v. Dale-upholding the Boys Scouts' right to
discriminate in the selection of their leadership-was probably
correct, no matter how lacking the Court's reasoning.48
Martinez, however, is not Dale. Dale involved a flat regulation of
associational membership and so was a relatively easy case. Martinez
involves the questions of government sponsorship and subsidies for
associations, as well as access by associations to the government's
physical property. The Court, unsurprisingly, given its modern
denuding of the association right, has not previously given serious
consideration to these questions and failed to do so again in Martinez
because of its dismissal of the association claims. Properly
understood, however, these questions lie at the heart of the Martinez
litigation, and it is to them that we now turn.
IH. State Sponsorship of Associations
The prior section of this paper established that contrary to the
mode of analysis in a series of modern Supreme Court cases, the right
of association should be understood as an important, independent
47. CLS's free speech challenge to the written Nondiscrimination Policy, not
considered by the majority, was also frankly quite weak. See generally Eugene Volokh,
Freedom of Expressive Association and Government Subsidies, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1919
(2006).
48. See Bhagwat, supra note 5, at 1001-02.
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liberty implicitly guaranteed by the First Amendment, which derives
primarily from the Assembly Clause of the First Amendment.
Furthermore, once the properly reinvigorated scope of the
association right is accepted, it becomes clear that application of
nondiscrimination rules to associations such as CLS raise serious First
Amendment concerns. This is not because such rules incidentally
impact CLS's ability to speak, but because such rules directly limit the
right of CLS members to define the boundaries of their association.
Therefore, if the State of California sought to directly regulate CLS's
choice of members, either flatly through an all-comers rule or on
specific, limited grounds through the enforcement of
nondiscrimination laws, there seems little doubt that CLS could make
out a valid First Amendment claim.
Yet CLS v. Martinez is not a case about direct regulation.
Instead, it is a case about state support, sponsorship, and recognition.
Recall that Hastings never required CLS to admit any members.
What it said was that CLS must comply with Hastings's policies if
CLS wanted RSO status.49 CLS remained free to reject such status
and continue to enforce any membership rules it pleased. The
question raised by the Martinez case, then, is what restrictions the
First Amendment places on the power of the state to condition
official sponsorship and subsidies on compliance with rules of conduct
which would otherwise violate the Constitution. And at a broader
level, the case raises the question of what the appropriate relationship
is between democratic associations such as CLS and the government.
Seen through this lens, it becomes apparent that there is a
fundamental contradiction at the heart of CLS's claim. To
understand why, it is necessary to consider the nature and purposes of
the associational right protected by the First Amendment. As
discussed above, the fundamental function of freedom of association,
like all of the political (i.e., nonreligious) liberties protected by the
First Amendment, is to enable self-governance. In particular, the
assembly and association rights enable groups of citizens to gather,
whether in an ad hoc assembly or in more permanent associations,so in
order to share their views and, in the original language of the
Assembly Clause, "consult for the common good."" The democratic
49. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2986.
50. See generally Inazu, Right of Association, supra note 40 at 491.
51. See Inazu, Forgotten Freedom, supra note 40 at 571-73 (discussing drafting history
of the Assembly Clause, and the eventual omission of the phrase "consult for the common
good" from the final draft).
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function of associations is not, however, limited to just speaking or
"consulting." Associations also play a critical role in value formation
by providing structures within which citizens can share and shape
their political and cultural values, a process with only a tenuous
connection to speech, as such.52  It is all of these functions in
combination that establish the significance of association and
assembly to self-governance.
A critical assumption underlying this analysis is that for
associations to play their democratic role, they must be autonomous
from the state. At the core of the American experiment is the
concept of popular sovereignty-that here the People rule, and rulers
are ultimately subservient to the People. For that principle to retain
meaning-for self-governance to have substance-citizens, the
sovereign People, must be able to form their values, develop their
opinions, speak, print, and petition their officials jointly and free from
state interference. This need for autonomy is fundamentally at odds
with attempts to seek state sponsorship or approval-such a
relationship is fundamentally inconsistent with the principle that
citizens, not rulers, constitute the ultimate authority in our system of
government. But the RSO status that CLS was seeking was
essentially a plea for state sponsorship and recognition, indeed a plea
for state subsidization. It is difficult to see, however, how a state-
sponsored association can play the democratic role that the First
Amendment envisions for associations. Such an association is
necessarily beholden to, or even a part of, the state's apparatus. But
if that is the case, necessarily the association cannot provide a space
for citizens to gather free from the state, or a place where they
exercise their ultimate sovereign power.
The underlying contradiction in CLS's quest for state recognition
is this: Any system of state sponsorship, recognition, or subsidization
for associations necessarily will require some rules of conduct and
even belief. Even if Hastings had had an obligation to grant RSO
status to CLS, no one believes that Hastings has an obligation to
recognize and fund, say, a student chapter of the Ku Klux Klan, or the
Nazi Party." Hastings could also, presumably, limit its RSO program
to groups whose objectives the school considered sufficiently related
52. For a discussion of the role of associations in value formation, see Seana Shiffrin,
What Is Really Wrong with Compelled Association?, 99 Nw. U. L. REv. 839, 840-41, 865-
66, 869 (2005).
53. See, e.g., Reply Brief of Petitioner at 10, Christian Legal Society v. Martinez 130 S.
Ct. 2971 (2010) No. 08-1371, 2009 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2093.
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to its program of legal education. Yet once the concession is made
that Hastings possesses the power to regulate the membership,
activities, and objectives of RSOs, the game is lost from a democratic
perspective. Such associations have inevitably surrendered the
autonomy that a democratic association requires under the First
Amendment.
A further point might be made here, about the relationship
between this principle of autonomy and the Supreme Court's free
speech jurisprudence. The Court has held that under certain
circumstances (in particular, when the government has created a
metaphysical "forum"), the government has an obligation to fund the
free speech of groups, including student groups, without regard to the
viewpoints expressed in the subsidized speech.54 Even if the Court is
correct in this regard (about which serious doubts might be raised),
there are good reasons to treat association differently from speech. It
may be possible to envision a truly neutral, one-time or episodic
program of governmental funding for speakers which might maintain
those speakers' autonomy, and so their contributions to self-
governance as envisioned by the First Amendment. Associations,
however, are complex, internally structured, and durable institutions.
Indeed, it is precisely their longevity and internal structure that
permits them to participate in self-governance effectively, in contrast
to ad hoc assemblies, which while necessary, cannot alone provide a
sufficient basis for citizen participation in government." But it is
precisely this permanence that makes state sponsorship so dangerous
to associations and suggests that it would undermine their democratic
functions. A long-term relationship with the state, with ongoing
oversight and regulation and repeated requests for funding (with the
opportunities for influence that that entails) creates an intolerable
risk that the autonomy of an association will be undermined over
time as a product of state sponsorship and funding." And
54. The prime example is Rosenberger v. Rectors and Visitors of University of
Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995). Cf Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569
(1998) (upholding restrict on funding, but only because it was not found to discriminate
based on viewpoint).
55. A contrast might be drawn here between the Tea Party Movement, obviously a
democratic association (or group of associations), and Glenn Beck's "Restoring Honor"
rally in Washington, D.C. on August 28, 2010. Surely the Tea Party has greater
significance for self-rule than a one-time rally.
56. The sort of state sponsorship or financial support I describe here does not include
such generally available, non-intrusive benefits as nonprofit, tax-exempt status, which pose
little or no risk to associational autonomy. But see Regan v. Taxation with Representation
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concomitantly, because an association which relies upon state
sponsorship or funds for its existence is essentially abdicating its
democratic role, there can be no First Amendment right to such
sponsorship since the resulting association is no longer within the
protections of the First Amendment. This is not to say that the
government may not voluntarily sponsor associations such as RSOs,
and associations may not voluntarily accept state sponsorship or
funds, but the First Amendment has little or nothing to say on this
subject."
Applying this reasoning to the facts of Martinez, the implications
are clear. CLS does not, and by its nature cannot, have a First
Amendment right to sponsorship, recognition, or funding from
Hastings. Any such right flies in the face of the First Amendment's
structural functions, and so is self-contradictory. It is only because of
the mistaken invocation by both the majority and the dissent of free
speech doctrine that CLS's claim had any credence at all. From an
associational perspective, which is surely the correct perspective in
this case, CLS's claim is incoherent.
IV. Associations and the Public Forum
The above analysis might seem to suggest that none of CLS's
claims had any weight and were properly denied across the board. In
fact, however, the truth is more complex. The reason for this is that
the denial by Hastings of RSO status did not just deprive CLS of state
sponsorship and recognition-i.e., the right to use the Hastings
name-and state funding; it also deprived CLS of some very tangible
benefits, including notably access to campus communications systems
(including email) and free use of on-campus meeting spaces. None of
the Justices considered this aspect of the case separately, though
admittedly the dissent does emphasize that the primary impact of the
loss of RSO status for CLS was lack of access to campus space, not
loss of funding." Presumably this was because the parties posed the
issue in the case as the availability of RSO status alone, without
differentiating between the benefits which accrued to RSOs. For that
of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983) (treating tax-exempt status as equivalent to a
direct subsidy). The Hastings RSO program, however, went well beyond tax-exempt
status by providing positive sponsorship and financial support for participants' activities.
57. 1 say "little or nothing" because it may be that the First Amendment should be
read to create barriers to the state's cooptation of existing, private associations; but that is
a topic beyond the scope of this paper.
58. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 3006-07 (Alito, J., dissenting).
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 38:3558
Spring2011] ASSOCIATIONS AND FORUMS: CLS V. MARTINEZ 559
reason, the Court was probably right not to consider the question of
access to campus space separately. But what if CLS had made the
argument that even if CLS was properly denied RSO status, Hastings
could not deprive unofficial student groups like CLS of access to
campus communications and physical spaces? Such a claim, it turns
out, poses a far more difficult question than a claim to state
sponsorship and funding.
The question of what First Amendment rights private individuals
or groups have to access government-owned property is governed by
the Supreme Court's "public forum" doctrine." Unsurprisingly,
however, given the content of the rest of the Court's nonreligion First
Amendment cases, the public forum doctrine has in modern times
been understood as concerning free speech rights on public property,
not other First Amendment liberties.6 Thus its application to claims
of association and assembly is far from clear. Moreover, even with
respect to free speech, the public forum doctrine is notable for its
incoherence and malleability. For example, the Martinez majority
describes the public forum doctrine as dividing government property
into three categories: Traditional public forums, designated public
forums, and limited public forums." In the former two categories, the
government is severely restricted in its power to limit speech, but in
the latter it may limit both the content of speech and the identity of
speakers, so long as the limits are reasonable and viewpoint neutral.'
Oddly, however, in earlier decisions the Court had described the third
category of less protected property as "nonpublic forums,""6 and
described limited public forums as a species of designated forums,
subject to greater access rights.6 More to the point for our purposes,
outside of the category of traditional public forums (which has been
strictly limited to public streets and parks), the Court has granted the
government almost unlimited discretion to define property as it
59. See, e.g., Hague v. Comm'n. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Perry Educ.
Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983); United States v. Grace, 461
U.S. 171 (1983); Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992).
60. See Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2984 (describing public forum doctrine as determining
"when a government entity, in regulating property in its charge, may place limitations on
speech" (emphasis added)); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790-91 (1989)
(discussing limits public forum doctrine places on government's power to regulate
"expression" and "speech").
61. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2984 n.11.
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788,800 (1985).
64. Id. at 803.
desires and therefore to deny property forum status by fiat." The net
result of such decisions is that except on occasion, the modern public
forum doctrine does not provide robust protection for speech rights in
public spaces.
Whatever the merits of the public forum doctrine as applied to
free speech, there are powerful reasons to think that a different
approach is needed when assembly and association rights are at stake.
The modern Court has utterly ignored the problem of associational
access to public spaces, subsuming association and assembly claims
under free speech. It should be noted that this was not always so; the
Court's first important public forum case, decided during the same
period that the Court was first recognizing assembly and association
rights, explicitly recognized the right of citizens to assemble in public
places and consult with each other, as well as to express their views."
The modern subsuming of assembly and association claims into the
speech right has caused the Court to miss an important point, which is
that the claim that associations and assemblies have for access to
public space is stronger than the claim of speakers alone. The reason
for this, quite simply, is that while speech and publication are
undoubtedly facilitated by the use of public spaces, public assembly
simply cannot occur without public spaces. Where else, after all, are
citizens to gather except on commonly held lands, or in public
buildings? Certainly during the Framing era, but even today, the
paucity of private spaces capable of holding significant citizen
assemblies means that assembly, almost by definition, means
assembly on public property. This in turn means that the textually
protected right of assembly necessarily presumes a right to use public
spaces, and so access to such spaces cannot be at the discretion or
whim of the very state officials that assemblies are meant to exercise
control over. That is the insight which led the Court to create the
public forum doctrine in the first place.
The relationship between association and public spaces is slightly
more complex, but in the end no more basic. An association of
individuals can of course exist wholly in private, since associations
constitute longstanding relationships. However, for an association to
have meaning and perform its democratic functions of consultation
and value formation, members must be able to gather together and
65. See Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992); Ark. Educ.
Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998).
66. Hague, 307 U.S. at 513-16.
67. Id. at 515-16.
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communicate with each other. During the Framing era, given limited
communications technologies and the expense associated with
publication, gathering often had to be face-to-face. And again, except
for the smallest associations, that required access to public spaces-
indeed, the fact that associations did and do assemble in person is
why the association and assembly right are so deeply intertwined.
Today, it is true, associations can exchange communications, and even
virtually "gather," using electronic communications. Notwithstanding
the power of resources such as social networking sites, however, there
is still enormous value to face-to-face meetings. Such gatherings
strengthen bonds, permit individuals to reaffirm their common values
and commitments, and may provide an essential means to
communicating an association's views to public officials, in a way that
online exchanges cannot accomplish." Thus, as with assembly, an
aspect of the right of association is a right of access to public spaces.
Of course, no right to access public spaces can be absolute. The
government uses its property for many purposes, and must have some
authority to balance its managerial needs against the needs and
desires of citizens, even when citizens act in their sovereign capacity
pursuant to the First Amendment. In modern times, as noted earlier,
the balance the Court has drawn between the government and free
speech rights has veered decisively in the government's favor. That
choice has been strongly criticized, not least by members of the Court
itself." Perhaps the Court has drawn this balance because, in modern
times and especially with the advent of electronic communications,
speech and publication are less dependent on use of the public space
than they once were. In any event, that question is beyond the scope
of this paper. With respect to assembly and association, however, the
above analysis indicates that the balance must drawn more favorably
to the First Amendment, because assembly and association remain,
for practical purposes, highly dependent on public spaces. As such,
granting the state the power to dictate access to its property by fiat is
essentially the power to denude these rights, a result surely forbidden
by the First Amendment. And this in turn indicates that the modern
public forum doctrine, which grants public officials essentially
unlimited discretion to control access to public spaces other than the
narrowly defined "traditional" public forums, should not be carried
68. For a discussion of the relationship between public gatherings and the First
Amendment petition right, see generally Ronald Krotoszynski, Jr. & Clint Carpenter, The
Return of Seditious Libel, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1239 (2008).
69. See Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. at 693-703 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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into the assembly and association arenas.o A new approach is
needed.
This is not the time to attempt to formulate a fully formed set of
rules governing associational access to public spaces. At a minimum,
however, it seems clear that the Court's current, three-tiered public
forum doctrine, with its emphasis on categorizing and blunt rules," is
not up to this task. Instead, a more nuanced, case-by-case approach,
which takes seriously the proposition that access to public spaces for
the purposes of association and assembly is a right, not a privilege
doled out by public officials, seems at least a good starting point.
Consider now Hastings, or any public university or college campus.
Students typically spend their entire day on campus. If they live in a
dormitory, as many students do, they may live, eat, sleep, work, and
play on campus-spending their entire lives for weeks on end almost
completely on university property. As Justice Alito put it, for
"students, the campus is their world."7 2 University students, who are
indeed adults, presumably enjoy full First Amendment rights,
including rights of association and assembly. If they are to exercise
those rights, however, it often would be on campus. Where else can
student associations meet, and how else can they seek out others to
associate with, if not on campus greens, through campus
communications, and in campus classrooms? Considered from the
perspective of a meaningful associational right for students, some
right of access to campus spaces is clearly required by the First
Amendment.
The implications of this conclusion for CLS v. Martinez seem
fairly straightforward. While Hastings was justified in declining to
give CLS the use of its name, or access to its funds, it was not free to
effectively force CLS off campus. Whether or not Hastings actually
did so is in fact disputed-the dissent suggests that it did, but the
majority asserts otherwise. 74 What is clear, however, is that at a
minimum CLS's access to meeting space on campus was substantially
70. See id at 695-96 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (recognizing this point and explicitly
linking access to the public forum with the assembly right).
71. See supra notes 59-65 & accompanying text.
72. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 3007 (Alito, J., dissenting) (quoting Reply Brief for
Petitioner 13, supra note 53); see also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 n.5 (1981)
(recognizing that "the campus of a public university, at least for its students, possesses
many of the characteristics of a public forum").
73. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 3006 (Alito, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 2991 (majority opinion).
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curtailed, if not eliminated, when it was denied RSO status.
Furthermore, it is undisputed that CLS's access to certain campus
communications systems, including notably campus email, a weekly
newsletter, and a Student Organizations Fair, was cut off by that
denial." These facts raise serious First Amendment concerns.7 ' At a
minimum, the First Amendment would seem to give student
associations, even (perhaps especially) unrecognized ones, some right
to meet on campus, to use campus rooms and open spaces."
Hastings's concession that CLS could use campus spaces on the same
terms as "community groups . . . [and] sometimes on a pay basis" was
inadequate to meet its obligations in this regard. Similarly, CLS's
exclusion from campus communications seems too broad, even
though (as with campus spaces) some regulation of access is surely
permissible to guard against misuse. On-campus bulletin boards and
the Student Organizations Fair are physical spaces to which
reasonable access must be permitted. An email system is not, of
course, an actual physical space. Given its communicative functions,
however, and the fact that it is generally open to student use, it seems
reasonable to analogize campus email systems to a "virtual public
space" to which access must be granted, again with reasonable
restrictions. Of course, universities have no obligation to actually
fund or maintain an email system or bulletin board, any more than
cities have an obligation to maintain parks. But if such spaces (virtual
or real) are created, student associations must be given access to
them. Finally, and contrary to the majority, the existence of private
electronic communications media such as social-networking sites does
not obviate the obligation of access. For one thing, the majority
substantially exaggerates the utility of such media in accomplishing an
association's goals," especially in recruiting new members or
communicating an association's views to the broader community (as
75. Id. at 2979.
76. It should be reiterated that CLS did not litigate a right of access to campus
facilities separately from its claim to RSO status. The discussion in the text considers only
what a reviewing court should have done if such separate claims had been brought.
77. The need for access to classrooms and other meeting spaces, not just campus
greens resembling parks, is accentuated by the facts of this case. Because Hastings is an
urban campus, it possesses essentially no open spaces. As such, denial of access to rooms,
assuming this occurred, would have been essentially the equivalent of denial of access to
the campus itself.
78. Id. at 3007 (Alito, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 2991 (majority opinion).
80. Id.
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opposed to communicating within the membership). Second, and
more generally, the existence of some private spaces useful to
associations cannot and should not eliminate the right of access to
public spaces if associational freedoms are not to suffer death by a
thousand cuts.
Of course, the right of access to public spaces cannot be an
unlimited one-as I began by noting, such access must be balanced
against the government's legitimate, managerial needs. Moreover, on
a college campus it may well be that the government's managerial
needs are greater than in other contexts, because after all, the
primary function of a university is education, not enabling student
associations." Rules governing access to classrooms can, of course,
prioritize actual classes, and limits can also be set on the sending of
all-campus emails, including perhaps even preclearance requirements,
to avoid jamming inboxes. The key, however, is to ensure that school
officials are not limiting access by diktat. To quote Justice Kennedy's
separate writing in an earlier public forum case, "the inquiry must be
an objective one, based on the actual, physical characteristics and uses
of the property."" School officials must be able to demonstrate that
any rule which places significant limits on student groups' access to
campus spaces (including email) is reasonably necessary to manage
the use of its property, or to guard against a realistic threat of misuse,
and is applied neutrally. The alternative approach, encapsulated in
the Court's current public forum doctrine, gives officials virtually
unreviewable discretion to limit access, subject only to a viewpoint-
neutrality requirement. Whatever the merits of this approach for
speech, it goes too far in permitting limits on association and
assembly."
Finally, some attention should be given to what sorts of
associations enjoy a First Amendment right of access to campus
81. See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267 n.5 ("A university's mission is education, and
decisions of this Court have never denied a university's authority to impose reasonable
regulations compatible with that mission upon the use of its campus and facilities.").
82. Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. at 695 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
83. Indeed, arguably the Court's decision in Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981),
implicitly recognizes this point. Widmar struck down a campus rule granting access to
campus facilities to student groups, but excluding religious groups, on the dubious
reasoning that such a restriction was viewpoint based. Perhaps the better reading of the
case is that the Court was recognizing, implicitly, that access to meeting places is the sine
qua non for the vitality of associational life for all groups, especially on college campuses.
See also Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993); Good
News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001) (applying holding of Widmar to grade
schools).
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spaces. First and foremost, it should be clear that only associations
which further the goals of the First Amendment-in other words,
those whose functions are relevant to self-governance-enjoy such a
right. For reasons that I have explored in more detail elsewhere,8 this
means at a minimum that associations with primarily commercial
goals are clearly not the sorts of associations protected by the First
Amendment, and so not entitled to access to campus spaces. In other
words, students have no right to use campus facilities or email to sell
things, or otherwise advance their economic interests. In addition
(though this is hardly likely to be an issue on college campuses),
organizations whose goals or methods are primarily criminal are also
not entitled to protection." Finally, it seems reasonable for campuses
to limit access to their facilities to student groups, meaning
associations organized by and composed of students.' This is not
because student associations are, as an abstract matter, entitled to
greater constitutional protection than nonstudent or mixed
associations. It follows rather from the nature of a university campus.
Unlike a park or a street, which are forums open to, and held for the
benefit of, the public generally, campuses are forums only for the
university community. That is both their purpose, and their
objectively defined use. Moreover, even university employees are in
a different position from students, because they are far less likely to
be as thoroughly tied to the campus as a student-in other words, the
campus is not typically their world (much less is it the world of the
general public).
Put differently, if rules governing access to public places may and
indeed must take account of context and the general use to which that
property is put, universities can adopt rules which recognize that
campus spaces serve students, not the general public. However,
84. Bhagwat, supra note 5, at 999-1001. It should be noted that the range of
associations whose goals are relevant to self-governance is not limited to associations
which engage in either political activities or expression. Rather, this term encompasses a
wide range of social, religious, or other associations.
85. See id. at 39-40.
86. A difficult question is raised by an association formed by students and composed
primarily of students, but which has a few nonstudent members. That Hastings refused to
grant RSO status to such groups, Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2985-86, is surely permissible. It
is less clear whether Hastings or other universities should be permitted to deny such
groups any access to campus spaces, but it may be that a bright-line rule limiting access to
student-only groups is permissible, in order to avoid the inevitable line-drawing problems
raised by any other approach. For a good discussion, see Volokh, supra note 47, at 1940-
41.
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contrary to what the Martinez majority argued,' the fact that
universities are permitted to limit access to their property to student
groups does not mean that any and all other restrictions on which
student groups may be granted use of university facilities is permitted,
so long as the minimal requirement of viewpoint neutrality is met. A
rule limiting access to student groups is justified by the nature of the
public space that is a university campus. Other rules restricting access
must be similarly justified, and must be shown not to impose
excessive obstacles to student associations and assemblies.
Conclusion
This article makes a number of points regarding the CLS v.
Martinez decision and more generally about current First
Amendment law. First, it argues that the Supreme Court erred in
analyzing Martinez as a case about free speech. Martinez is a case
about the right of association. The Christian Law Society is an
association which sought to define the bounds of its association, not
particularly to speak. Second, this article argues that current First
Amendment doctrine inadequately protects the right of association.
In the modern era, the Supreme Court has departed from the
historical understanding of the association right and from the Court's
own early case law on association and assembly, both of which treated
association as an independent First Amendment liberty linked to and
derived primarily from the Assembly Clause of the First Amendment.
The modern Court, however, has treated association as a right
derivative of, and subsidiary to free speech. This approach
profoundly under-appreciates the significance of, and under-protects,
the First Amendment right of association. Third, this article argues
that when the Martinez case is analyzed from an associational lens, it
becomes clear that CLS's primary claim, for official recognition by
Hastings including the use of the Hastings name and access to funds
from Hastings, cannot stand. The First Amendment protects
democratic associations which are independent of and autonomous
from the state. This principle cannot be reconciled with the sort of
official sponsorship sought by CLS. Finally, however, the article
concludes that if CLS had separately sought access to Hastings's
campus facilities, including meeting space and use of communications
media such as email (which it did not), it would have had a much
more powerful claim-in short, had it sought that access, CLS would
87. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2985-86.
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probably have been entitled to half a pie. The nature of the
association right, and the assembly right from which it derives,
necessarily encompasses some right to use public spaces.
Furthermore, that right should extend to university campuses, not just
traditional public forums such as streets and parks. Current law, in
the shape of the public forum doctrine, focuses narrowly on the right
of free speech, and as a result fails to adequately protect the right of
assemblies and associations to gather in public spaces. This is a grave
error because it denies democratic associations such as CLS the
independence and autonomy that they require.
Of course, none of the above analysis rests on current law.
Furthermore, the evisceration of both the associational right and the
public forum doctrine seem quite entrenched in the Supreme Court's
decisions at this stage. Hopefully, however, in the coming years a
rethinking will occur. Just as in the wider world, so also in the
university and law school settings, democratic associations and
assemblies play a fundamental role in the process of self-governance
through which citizens, the sovereign People, exercise control over
their government. Access to government property is the lifeblood of
such associations and assemblies. The First Amendment therefore
must be read to protect the autonomy of such associations, and their
right to access public places, if the Amendment is to continue to play
its fundamental role in our constitutional system.
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